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Do Small Farmers Borrow Less when the Lending rate 
Increases? The Case of Rice Farming in the Philippines 
 
The new generation of credit programs directed at small 
borrowers emphasizes financial sustainability. Based on anecdotal 
information (especially from microfinance experiences), proponents of 
cost recovery claim that raising formal lending rates would have a 
minimal impact on borrowing. Rigorous evidence for this conjecture is 
however sparse. This study conducts an econometric test of this 
conjecture using data from a survey of small rice farmers from the 
Philippines. Alternative regression techniques tend to reject the 
conjecture; in particular, a regression that controls for selection effects 
shows a unitary elastic response of formal borrowing to the lending rate.   
Key words: credit demand, interest elasticity, rural credit, credit 
policy, Philippines, Asia 
 
1.Introduction 
In many developing countries, rural credit programs are on a transition 
from subsidized to market-oriented schemes. An important manifestation of this 
is the growth of microfinance. Microfinance advocates favor raising lending rates 
to market levels to improve cost recovery. One of the ‘key principles of 
microfinance’ states: ‘Microfinance can pay for itself, and must do so if it is to 
reach very large numbers of poor people’ (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 
2004).  
The ability to simultaneously increase outreach and interest rates assumes 
that the poor would not significantly reduce their borrowing when the lending 
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rate is increased. Proponents of this conjecture argue that the problem faced by 
the poor is not the cost, but rather access to credit. Hence for example, informal 
moneylenders who do provide access to the poor are able to charge exorbitant 
interest rates.  
Such assessments of credit demand response are typically based on 
anecdotal evidence. Rigorous empirical tests of this conjecture are sparse. To 
remedy this gap, this study conducts such a test using data from a survey of rice 
farmers in the Philippines. The major finding is that increasing the effective 
lending rate has a negative and statistically significant effect on the demand for 
credit, contrary to the conjecture. Demand response must therefore be an 
important consideration in designing the interest rate policy of financial 
institutions serving small borrowers.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides 
additional background and related studies. Section 3 develops the theoretical 
framework and econometric model. Section 4 presents the survey frame and data 
analysis. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Background and related studies 
2.1. Rural credit markets and policies 
In rural credit markets, informal lending rates are typically much higher 
than formal lending rates. On the other hand, formal loans are associated with 
more stringent requirements and other transaction costs that deter poor borrowers 
(Zeller and Sharma, 2001). The traditional policy response was to impose interest 
rate ceilings on and provide subsidies to formal credit. This regime of ‘financial 
repression’ however proved to be ineffective and costly. Financial repression was 
largely dismantled in the wave of structural adjustment and stabilization 
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programs in the 1980s. Subsidized credit programs were downsized, state 
financial institutions were restructured, and restrictions in financial markets were 
lifted (Conning and Udry, 2005).  
Within this period, several microfinance institutions became prominent 
for extending loans to the poor, without generous external support, while 
maintaining a sound financial standing. This was accomplished by lending to 
small borrowers at interest rates closer to market levels, while achieving high 
repayment rates. The features and accomplishments of such microfinance 
schemes contrasted sharply with the earlier state-run schemes of subsidized 
credit (Morduch, 1999).  
The microfinance experience supports the notion that demand response 
would be minimal if formal lending rates are raised to market levels. Proponents 
of this claim argue that main obstacle confronting credit for the poor is not the 
interest rate, but rather lack of access. Unavailability of credit for the poor is 
mainly attributed to the collateral requirement imposed by formal lenders 
(Littlefield and Rosenberg, 2004). Traditional patronage of the poor for very 
expensive but accessible loans from informal lenders is seen as evidence of 
affordability of market rates for formal loans. However Morduch (1999, p. 1594) 
asseses the empirical status of the conjecture as follows: “Anecdotal evidence for 
this claim, however, tends to rely on either partial analytics (e.g., application of 
the principle of declining marginal returns to capital when all else is not held 
constant) or incomplete views of demand conditions (e.g., seeing demand at high 
interest rates but overlooking the pool of potential borrowers that are discouraged 
by high costs).”  
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Only a few empirical studies test this hypothesis; those that do tend to 
find an interest elasticity of credit demand to be substantially greater (in absolute 
terms) than zero. For example, a study of small and medium enterprises in Ghana 
obtains an interest rate elasticity of around -1.1 (Amonoo et al 2003). One major 
problem confronting empirical analysis is the segmentation of the credit market 
(Banerjee, 2003). Interest rates could be adjusted by the lender depending on 
borrower characteristics correlated with risk, trustworthiness, and ability to 
repay. The same borrower characteristics are typically included in regression 
models to control for other factors affecting credit demand. Hence, the 
correlation introduces endogeneity (a type of omitted variable problem).  
Two very recent studies use randomized experiments to correct for this 
source of bias. Karlan and Zinman (2005) find complex patterns of interest rate 
response of consumption credit, though none are close to zero. For microfinance, 
Dehejia et al (2005) examine a Dhaka-based program and find a demand 
elasticity of about unity. Despite these findings, the unresponsive-demand 
conjecture remains popular among rural credit proponents.  
 
2.2. The Philippine case 
The Philippines went through the phases of financial repression and 
structural adjustment over the last three decades. Interest rate ceilings, state-
supplied credit (especially for rice and corn farming), credit subsidies, and 
mandatory lending to agriculture were imposed in the 1970s, but were mostly 
discontinued in the late 1980s (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991). Nevertheless 
government-owned financial institutions maintain a significant presence in the 
countryside. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) serves as the main credit 
arm for reaching the small farmer.  
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Small farmer credit is usually channeled through farmer cooperatives and 
and rural banks. A large proportion of the loans is taken up by the rice sector. 
Effectively cooperatives serve as conduits of LBP funds to individual members, 
who assume joint liability. Loans to farmer cooperatives require collateral, 
though crop insurance may be applied as a collateral substitute. In practice the 
vast majority of farmers are unable or unwilling to put up collateral for loans, 
hence LBP loans carry mandatory crop insurance.  
The sole provider of crop insurance is the state-owned Philippine Crop 
Insurance Corporation (PCIC). Up to 1990, for rice, the farmer’s premium was 
fixed at 2.0% of the crop loan; that of the LBP was 1.55%, and the government 
subsidy was 4.5%. These rates applied uniformly in all areas. From 1991, 
premiums began to increase, and rates were allowed to diverge across the various 
regions. While the LBP premium share was fixed at 2.0%, the amount of 
government subsidy began to vary over time, implying an erratic policy of cost 
recovery from borrowers.  
Data on formal and informal lending rates facing agrarian reform 
beneficiaries is reported in Bravo and Pantoja (1998). For 1996-1997, the formal 
lending rate (average of cooperatives and rural banks) was 28.2% per annum, 
which is much lower than the reported lending rate of informal credit (obtained 
from traders, moneylenders, and input dealers). However the majority of small 
farmers are in fact not enrolled in these schemes. Based on a survey by the 
Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC), among farmers who borrow, 68% 
obtain informal loans, with the largest source being professional moneylenders 
(40%). This is followed by relatives or friends, employers, traders, retailers, and 
suppliers. Farmers describe informal loans as more convenient, due to quick loan 
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release and the absence of documentation requirements (Cañeda and Badiola, 
1999). This suggests that informal borrowing is more common than formal 
borrowing, despite its higher interest cost, as transaction costs are higher for the 
latter. The same survey shows that over half of sample farmers (53%) do not 
borrow at all; such farmers self-finance their crop production.  
Due to financial difficulties faced by the PCIC in late 1990s onwards, the 
issue of raising premium rates aroused contentious debate. Some reasoned – in 
parallel with microfinance-inspired arguments cited earlier – that farmers would 
be willing to pay higher effective lending rates for LBP loans, as these would 
still remain far cheaper than interest rates charged by informal lenders 
(Montemayor, 1999). On the other hand, opponents claimed that such an 
adjustment would discourage borrowing and undermine state policy to promote 
small farmers’ welfare. Clearly systematic empirical analysis would be very 
useful to provide a sound basis for policy.  
 
3. Modeling farm credit demand  
3.1. Credit demand 
Consider a farmer selecting the amount to borrow to finance working 
capital requirements of crop production, with the loan falling due at the end of 
the cropping season. Under constant returns in production, crop loans can be 
expressed per unit area. Production is risky, providing a rationale for crop 
insurance. Two possible sources of loans are the bank and the informal lender; 
the commodity characteristics of a loan from either source are similar, except 
that bank borrowing carries a mandatory insurance cover. Furthermore a bank 
loan is subject to fixed transaction cost; the transaction cost for informal 
borrowing is normalized at zero. The effective interest rate of the bank loan, 
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denoted R, is the sum of the interest rate charge and the insurance premium. The 
effective bank rate is lower than informal lending rate, denoted Q.  Production 
and borrowing choices are determined by expected utility maximization subject 
to asset endowment, technology, and market prices.  
 Formalization of the foregoing set-up leads to a derivation of a credit 
demand curve (Figure 1), where total borrowing is represented by the horizontal 
axis. (Details of the derivation are available upon request.) The intuition behind 
the curve is quite transparent: farmers would borrow from only one source for a 
given season; the relevant lending rate (represented by the vertical axis) would 
depend on the loan source. At a sufficiently low R, borrowing is entirely formal, 
i.e. there is no informal borrowing for bank interest rates within the range[ ]0, cR . 
As R increases within this range, bank borrowing declines; at the top of this 
range, the farmer switches to informal borrowing. Above cR , the relevant interest 
rate is Q; likewise as Q increases, informal borrowing declines; at the vertical 
intercept cQ , the farmer switches entirely to self-finance.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
At the switch from a formal to an informal loan, it is possible that the 
farmer may reduce borrowing by a discrete amount; that is, there may be a jump 
discontinuity along the credit demand curve. The reason is that bank borrowing 
provides an insurance cover, which disappears completely when the farmer 
switches to informal borrowing.  
Lending rates are not the only factors affecting credit demand. The 
following will alter the the position of the demand curve: the variability of yield 
and aversion to risk; the cost structure of farming; and the cost structure of self-
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finance, that is, indicators of consumption and consumption smoothing 
requirements of the farm household.  
 
3.2. Econometric model 
Suppose the functional relationships between borrowing and interest rates 
are preserved under a natural logarithmic transformation. Let i index the 
individual farmer, iB  the credit demanded (in natural logs), iR  and 
iQ respectively the bank and informal lending rates facing the farmer (in natural 
logs), ciR  the critical bank lending rate, and iZ  the farmer-specific vector of 
variables that also determine credit demand. Given deterministic variables and in 
general form, the demand function is described as follows:  
( , ) for 
( , ) otherwise
i i ci
i
i
F R R R
B
G Q
≤⎧= ⎨⎩
i
i
Z
Z
      (1) 
Estimation of (1) may be limited only to F, that is, the portion of the 
curve for formal borrowing; however if the sample contains both formal and 
informal borrowers, this limitation would discard some of the sample 
information. On the other hand, estimation of (1) can encompass both formal and 
informal borrowing within a single demand curve. The stochastic version of the 
model incorporates an error term iε  with the usual properties. Suppose further 
that from the outset that farmers are exogenously sorted into bank borrowers and 
informal borrowers, and the possible discontinuity at the critical interest rate 
affects only the slope of the demand function with respect to the interest rate. Let 
iBNK  be a dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 for bank borrowers and 
zero otherwise. Then (incorporating the parameter terms) the credit demand 
function (in linear form) can be compactly stated as follows: 
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 The coefficients 1β  and 2β  are the interest rate elasticities. The dummy 
interaction creates a distinction in the slope of the demand curve for formal loans 
compared to informal loans. Based on statistical inference we can test whether or 
not 1β , the elasticity of demand for formal loans, differs from zero.  
Under classical assumptions, model fitting can be done by ordinary least 
squares. There are however good reasons to suspect departure from classical 
assumptions. One is that some farmers may opt to fully self-finance working 
capital; the case of zero borrowings implies truncation at zero, which can be 
corrected by Tobit regression. The second departure takes the form of 
endogeneity problems. One source, as mentioned earlier, is the potential 
endogeneity of interest rates. Rural credit markets in the Philippines are 
segmented (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991). Several methods are available for 
correcting this once the endogeneity problem is confirmed. The second source is 
endogeneity in the bank borrower dummy used in (2); that is, farmers may be 
endogenously sorted between those who are bank borrowers and those who are 
not. It is therefore a variation of the sample selection problem, which may also 
need to be corrected in the regression.  
 
4. Implementation 
4.1. Survey frame 
A survey of rice farmers covering LBP (“bank”) borrowers and non-
bank-borrowing farmers was conducted for crop year 2000-2001. Interviews 
were conducted using a structured survey questionnaire, which covers 
demographic and household information, farm characteristics, and various data 
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for crop year 2000-2001, namely: cost and returns, borrowing, lending rate, 
insurance premium, insurance cover, and insurance claims. Data is computed as 
the average over two cropping seasons within the crop year. The survey also 
collected information on farm assets, nonfarm assets, as well as the history of 
borrowing and insurance of the previous five years. 
During the survey period, the country was divided into 79 provinces, 
grouped into 17 administrative regions. Respondents are drawn from the top six 
regions in terms of number of bank borrowers, namely: Cagayan Valley, Central 
Luzon, Nueva Ecija, Western Visayas, Western Mindanao, and Southern 
Mindanao. The first three belong to the Luzon (the country’s northern island 
group), the fourth to Visayas (the central island group), and the last two to 
Mindanao (the southern island group).  
From each region a representative cooperative is found with the 
assistance of the regional office of the PCIC. To identify this cooperative, an 
“average province” within the region is selected, based on the number of bank 
borrowers, total farm area of bank borrowers, total amount of loan, and total 
insurance indemnities. Within this province, the cooperative whose membership 
size, amount of cover, premium paid, and indemnities received are closest to the 
provincial average is identified as the representative cooperative.  The 
cooperative and its host village comprise one survey site per region. (For 
Cagayan Valley though, two provinces appeared to be representative, hence a 
sample was drawn from both, with bank and non-bank borrowers evenly split 
between them.)  
Within the village, eight cooperative members who are bank borrowers in 
2000-2001 are randomly chosen using the cooperative’s membership list. In the 
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same site, eight farmers are randomly selected as a control group using the 
master list of village residents (excluding the current bank borrowers). Hence, 
the plan was each that of the six project sites contributes sixteen respondents, for 
a total sample size of 96, evenly divided between bank borrowers and non-bank 
borrowers.  
 
4.2. Data  
Upon completion of the survey, one observation from the control group 
was discarded. The conduct of the survey needed to adjust to inaccuracies in the 
cooperative records; hence the sample was drawn from 7 provinces. (For 5 of 
these, the borrowers were equally split between the bank borrowers and the 
control group. For the two provinces the split was 5:3 and 2:6). The data contains 
the following variables: 
BOR 
 
per ha crop loans, in pesos, survey year  
 
AGE 
 
Age of household head 
 
SCHOOL 
 
Years of schooling of household head 
 
HHSIZE 
 
Number of household members 
 
IRRIGATE 
 
Proportion of land under national or communal irrigation 
 
TENANT 
 
Proportion of land held as share tenant 
 
FMAST 
 
Current value of farm equipment stock 
 
NFMAST 
 
Current value of nonfarm fixed assets 
 
LANDV 
 
Current value of landholding 
 
YRDEBT 
 
Years of experience in borrowing from cooperative 
 
CLAIMS 
 
Frequency of indemnity claims over the past five years  
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The explanatory variables proxy for differential access to technology, 
different degrees of risk and risk aversion, and differences in asset endowment, 
which determine the cost of self-finance. AGE and SCHOOL are measures of 
assets in the form of human capital; FMAST, NFMAST, and LANDV measure 
ownership of fixed assets. FMAST and SCHOOL may also measure differences 
in access to technology, while LANDV may indicate favorable locations and land 
quality. IRRIGATE could be a proxy for productivity as well as output risk. 
Meanwhile, TENANT could be capturing the degree of risk aversion of the 
farmer as well as differences in asset ownership. A larger HHSIZE implies 
greater cost of self-finance, due to larger consumption requirements and greater 
vulnerability to consumption shocks. CLAIMS  is another indicator of yield risk. 
Higher YRDEBT proxies for lower transaction cost in dealing with a formal 
lender.  
Descriptive statistics of the key variables are shown in Table 1. Among 
borrowers, loan size averages about 8,200 pesos/ha. No bank borrower received a 
loan in excess of 16,000 pesos/ha, which is the ceiling on insurance cover and 
approximately the maximum loan limit imposed by LBP. Bank loans are larger 
than informal loans, but charge a lower effective lending rate. Among the control 
group there were 30 farmers who did not avail of crop loans within the survey 
period. Consistent with our theoretical framework, with one exception, farmers 
do not mix production credit from bank and informal sources at any time within a 
crop year. (In the exceptional case, the farmer borrowed only a small amount 
informally from a trader. In the data set this farmer is treated as a formal 
borrower only.)  
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Moreover the respondents described crop loans in a fairly stereotypical 
manner – provided at the beginning of the cropping season, to be used to puchase 
production inputs, and repaid at the end of the cropping season (which lasts about 
four months). Hence it is reasonable to regard bank and informal loans as 
homogenous product forms.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
As for farmer characteristics: the respondents are typically middle-aged, 
and have had secondary schooling. Most of the respondents reported small farm 
sizes (a little over 2 ha. on average). Farm areas are mainly planted to rice. Land 
irrigated by national or communal facilities accounts for over half of rice lands 
on average. Due to the agrarian reform program, sharecropping is now a minor 
tenancy arrangement. 
  
4.3. Econometric analysis 
We seek to estimate a model corresponding to equation (2). We include 
dummy variables for major island groups (Nueva Ecija province omitted) to 
control for geographical variations. Regression is implemented with STATA. In 
the following the significance level is set at 5%. The variables BOR, AGE, 
SCHOOL, HHSIZE, FMAST, NFMAST, LANDV, and YRDEBT are all 
transformed into their natural logarithms (to simplify notation we retain the same 
variable labels).  
Table 2 presents the results of least squares regression on bank borrowers 
only. The interest rate elasticity is statistically significant, of the expected sign, 
and is above unity. The only other significant variables are AGE, HHSIZE, 
NFMAST, CLAIMS, LUZ, and VI. The model as a whole is significant, with an 
adjusted-R2 of 0.56. The Cook-Weisberg test fails to spot heteroscedasticity 
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( 2Pr( ) 0.19cχ χ> = ), while the Ramsey reset test does not detect an omitted 
variable ( Pr( )cF F> =0.26).  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Consider a regression for the full sample (Table 3). The least squares 
estimates now have both interest rate terms, whose coefficients are of the right 
sign. The elasticities are (in absolute terms) much greater than those computed 
from the limited sample. A Wald test rejects identity of the coefficients 
( Pr( )cF F> =  0.019). However only the the informal lending rate term is 
significant at the 5% level. The variables with significant coefficients are also 
much different. The model as a whole remains significant; adjusted-R2 is higher 
at 0.63. However the Cook-Weisberg test detects heteroscedasticity 
( 2Pr( ) 0.007cχ χ> = ), and Ramsey reset detects an omitted variable problem 
( Pr( )cF F> =0.000). Results from a robust regression correcting for 
heteroscedasticity are also presented in Table 3. Standard errors increase, and the 
insensitivity of borrowing to the bank lending rate cannot be rejected.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The least squares estimates for the full-sample are problematic due to the 
large number of zero observations for the dependent variable. Correcting this 
through Tobit regression (Table 4) dramatically increases the interest rate 
elasticities, as well as shrinking the standard errors (with both interest rate terms 
becoming significant).  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
However robust truncated regression (also in Table 4) again fails to 
confirm the statistical significance of the formal lending rate term. Nor does the 
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Wald test reject equality between the coefficients of the two interest rate terms 
( 2Pr( ) 0.09cχ χ> = . Moreover the endogeneity problem remains uncorrected, as 
the residual plot from the robust Tobit regression shows a clear downward 
sloping pattern (Figure 2).  
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
One possible source of endogeneity is that of the interest rate, owing to 
market segmentation. Individual-level sorting of clients, under product 
homogeneity, would violate the law of one price. To confirm this we take a direct 
approach of inspecting the data for violations. The data set reveals that annual 
lending rates take only several discrete values. Table 5 presents the frequency 
count for each of these values. For bank loans, lending rates take on only one 
value for each province. That is, a cooperative sets only one lending rate for all 
members. Somewhat surprising is that within each survey site, informal 
borrowers usually face the same interest rate as well.1 The law-of-one price also 
holds for the informal sector.  
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
This finding does not actually conflict with the literature which finds 
market segmentation across the broad spectrum of informal loan types and over 
various types of rural households. The data is restricted to crop loans for small 
rice farmers. Product characteristics are therefore highly standardized, even 
within the informal sector.  
                                                 
1 Three respondents mentioned obtaining informal loans from relatives at low rates. However 
loan sizes were small; further questioning indicated that these loans were mostly for 
consumption. One exception remains, in which just two farmers in the same location obtain 
different informal lending rates.  
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We now turn to the other source of endogeneity, namely the type of loan. 
Unfortunately simple inspection of the data set cannot rule out this type of 
endogeneity. We therefore turn to Heckman regression, which is a more general 
technique for dealing with selection bias. The Heckman regression is conducted 
in two stages. The dependent variable in the latent variable regression is 
restricted only to bank loans; the explanatory factors are the bank lending rate 
and the Z-variables. The informal lending rate is not included. The selection 
equation contains all the second stage variables along with the informal lending 
rate, in their original (untransformed) values.  
The regression is implemented with a two step estimator (Table 6) and 
with maximum likelihood estimator (Table 7). In both cases the bank lending 
rate coefficient is negative, and highly significant. Credit demand response is 
close to unit elastic; note that this is lower than the result obtained from the sub-
sample, least squares regression in Table 1. Many of the other control variables 
are statistically significant, namely age (negative effect), household size (positive 
effect), farm assets (positive effect), nonfarm assets (negative effect), claims 
history (positive effect), and the geographic dummies except Mindanao. The 
residual plot shows a much more even scatter, obviating the slope pattern found 
from the earlier Tobit regression. Results from the maximum likelihood 
estimator are nearly identical to those of the two-step regression.  
[TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE] 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In summary, the regression results point consistently toward nonzero 
elasticity of credit demand response to the bank lending rate. In the last pair of 
  
16
regressions which control for the selection problem, the bank lending rate 
elasticity is significant and close to unity.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Cost recovery policies in rural credit programs are controversial. A 
popular conjecture in the literature and related discussions is the insensitivity of 
credit demand to increases in the lending rate. The debate is however informed 
by little more than casual empirics. For example, informal credit, which is seen 
as the alternative to formal credit, charges much higher interest rates, but 
continues to be patronized. Another common argument is that the ‘enterprising 
poor’ borrow little, not because of high credit cost, but because of inability to 
obtain access to credit due to collateral requirements.  
This study informs the discussion by producing quantitative evidence 
regarding this conjecture. Data was obtained from a survey of small rice farmers, 
covering bank borrowers, informal borrowers, and non-borrowers. Regression 
analysis points to a negative and significant effect of the effective lending rate on 
the demand for credit. Upon correcting for selection effects, the interest rate 
elasticity is found to be close to unity.  
Demand response alone is insufficient to derive any recommendations on 
interest rate and insurance premium policies. The supply side of formal lending 
should also be examined, in terms of cost, sustainability, and the welfare loss 
from subsidizing production loans. Nevertheless the study indicates that 
borrowing response should be a serious concern in designing cost recovery 
policies for rural finance.  
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Figure 1: The credit demand curve  
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Figure 2: Residual plot for the robust Tobit regression 
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Figure 3: Residual plot for the Heckman latent variable regression 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of key variables  
 Mean Standard 
deviation
Min Max 
Loan/ha (borrowers) 8,184.2 3,858.9 1,500 14,399
Bank loan/ha (borrowers) 9,334.1 3,435.8 2,985.1 14,399
Informal loan/ha (borrowers) 4,662.8 2,866.0 1,500.0 10,000
Effective bank lending rate  35.5 4.67 29.3 43.8
Informal lending rate 90.0 30.0 60.0 120
Age, in years 50.1 13.3 27.0 79
Schooling, in years 8.5 3.5 0.0 17
Household size 5.1 2.6 1.0 12
Farm size, ha  2.3 1.7 0.2 8
Owned land value, ‘000 pesos 435,434.2 657,396.5 0.0 3,500,000
Farm asset value, pesos 60,614.7 120,903.9 0.0 978,998.8
Nonfarm asset value, ‘pesos 331,634.2 543,147.6 1,500 3,873,000
Area irrigated (%) 60.1 46.6 0.0 100
Area under sharecrop (%) 11.8 29.3 0.0 100
Years LBP borrower 1.2 1.6 0 4
 
Note: The average exchange rate in 2000 was 44.4 pesos per US$.   
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Table 2: Least squares regression of credit demand, formal borrowers only 
Variable Coefficient Pr(t > tc) 
 
R   -1.221** 0.01 
AGE   -0.589** 0.01 
SCHOOL -0.218 0.11 
HHSIZE* 0.296 0.03 
IRRIG 0.010 0.94 
LANDV -0.002 0.83 
TENANT 0.166 0.42 
FMAST 0.030 0.12 
NFMAST -0.083* 0.03 
CLAIMS  0.077* 0.05 
YRDEBT 0.089 0.51 
LUZ* -0.772 0.00 
VI* -0.999 0.00 
MINDA -0.350 0.07 
Constant   16.711** 0.00 
 
aPr(F>F-critical) = 0.00. 
*Significant at 5% level.  
**Significant at 1% level. 
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Table 3: Least squares and robust regression of credit demand 
 Least squaresa 
 
Robust regressionb 
 
Variable Coefficient Pr(t > tc) Coefficient 
 
Pr(t > tc) 
R*(BNKB) -2.645 0.07 -2.645 0.16 
Q*(1-BNKB)   -3.470* * 0.00   -3.470*  0.02 
AGE -0.758 0.55 -0.758 0.54 
SCHOOL -0.083 0.91 -0.083 0.91 
HHSIZE -0.145 0.83 -0.145 0.84 
IRRIG -0.009 0.99 -0.009 0.99 
LANDV  0.128* 0.02  0.128* 0.02 
TENANT**   4.115** 0.00   4.115** 0.01 
FMAST 0.007 0.95 0.007 0.95 
NFMAST -0.150 0.52 -0.150 0.53 
CLAIMS 0.209 0.46 0.209 0.34 
YRDEBT       -0.432 0.52       -0.432 0.44 
LUZ 1.191 0.22 1.191 0.15 
VI -0.500 0.65 -0.500 0.55 
MINDA 0.664 0.51 0.664 0.44 
Constant  15.777* 0.05  15.777 0.12 
aPr(F>F-critical) = 0.00. 
bPr(Chi2 > Chi2-critical) = 0.00.  
*Significant at 5% level.  
**Significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4: Tobit regression of credit demand 
 Tobit regressiona 
 
Tobit robust regressionb 
 
Variable Coefficient Pr(t > tc) Coefficient 
 
Pr(t > tc) 
R*(BNKB)   -4.187* 0.03 -4.187 0.08 
Q*(1-BNKB)   -5.110** 0.00   -5.110** 0.01 
AGE 0.936 0.58 0.936 0.57 
SCHOOL -0.204 0.83 -0.204 0.84 
HHSIZE -0.381 0.68 -0.381 0.69 
IRRIG -0.116 0.90 -0.116 0.91 
LANDV   0.199** 0.01   0.199** 0.01 
TENANT**   5.687** 0.00   5.687** 0.00 
FMAST 0.010 0.95 0.010 0.95 
NFMAST -0.206 0.49 -0.206 0.50 
CLAIMS 0.292 0.42 0.292 0.28 
YRDEBT -1.017 0.28 -1.017 0.23 
LUZ 2.004 0.16 2.004 0.10 
VI -0.113 0.94 -0.113 0.92 
MINDA 1.438 0.32 1.438 0.23 
Constant  21.104* 0.05 21.104 0.11 
 
aPr(F>F-critical) = 0.00. 
bPr(Chi2 > Chi2-critical) = 0.00.  
*Significant at 5% level.  
**Significant at 1% level 
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Table 5: Frequency count of lending rates 
 
 Formal borrowers  Informal borrowers 
 24 30 36 Total  60 90 120 Total 
1 5 0 0 5  0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 2 2  0 0 1 1 
3 0 8 0 8  0 0 0 0 
4 10 0 0 10  5 0 0 5 
5 8 0 0 8  1 1 0 2 
6 0 0 8 8  3 0 0 3 
7 0 0 8 8  0 0 5 5 
Total 23 8 18 49  9 1 6 16 
  
 
  
26
Table 6: Heckman regression, two-step estimatora 
 
Latent variable equation Selection equation  
Variable Coefficient P(t > tc) Coefficient P(t > tc) 
R*(BNKB)    -1.067** 0.01 -0.069 0.16 
Q*(1-BNKB)   -0.019 0.07 
AGE    -0.643** 0.00 -0.030 0.10 
SCHOOL -0.181 0.13 0.116 0.11 
HHSIZE    0.311** 0.01 -0.023 0.79 
IRRIG 0.034 0.75 0.236 0.66 
LANDV -0.002 0.78 0.000 0.27 
TENANT 0.170 0.31 0.167 0.80 
FMAST   0.035* 0.03 0.000 0.62 
NFMAST   -0.061* 0.04 0.000 0.64 
CLAIMS    0.130** 0.00 1.153 0.00 
YRDEBT  0.117 0.30 0.190 0.14 
LUZ    -0.754** 0.00 -1.928 0.01 
VI    -1.021** 0.00 -1.758 0.06 
MINDA -0.280 0.08 -0.986 0.13 
Constant  15.713** 0.00 4.526 0.14 
 
a Pr(Chi2 > Chi2-critical) = 0.00.  
 
*Significant at 5% level.  
**Significant at 1% level. 
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Table 7: Heckman regression, maximum likelihood estimator a 
Latent variable equation Selection equation  
Variable Coefficient P(t > tc) Coefficient P(t > tc) 
R*(BNKB)   -1.065** 0.00 -0.069 0.17 
Q*(1-BNKB) - - -0.018 0.09 
AGE   -0.645** 0.00 -0.032 0.08 
SCHOOL -0.181 0.12 0.111 0.12 
HHSIZE   0.309** 0.01 -0.027 0.75 
IRRIG 0.038 0.71 0.259 0.63 
LANDV -0.002 0.78 0.000 0.27 
TENANT 0.171 0.31 0.000 0.82 
FMAST 0.035* 0.03 0.000 0.59 
NFMAST  -0.060* 0.04 0.000 0.69 
CLAIMS    0.130** 0.00 1.154 0.00 
YRDEBT 0.119 0.29 0.185 0.15 
LUZ   -0.754** 0.00 -1.888 0.01 
VI   -1.025** 0.00 -1.754 0.06 
MINDA -0.280 0.08 -0.945 0.15 
Constant  15.707* 0.00 4.528 0.14 
 
a Note: Pr(Chi2 > Chi2-critical) = 0.00.  
 
*Significant at 5% level.  
**Significant at 1% level. 
 
 
